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This study undertakes an analysis of the relationship between Canadian mon-
etary policy and the movements of Canada’s real and nominal exchange rates
with respect to the United States and, less directly, with respect to the rest of
the world.1 It encompasses, extends and broadens a range of more narrowly-
focused rigorous theoretical models that dealt with speciﬁc details relating
the real exchange rate to utility functions in endowment models, or expected
changes in real exchange rates to real interest rate diﬀerentials in asset pricing
models, and with speciﬁc individual sources of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations
in models with traded and non-traded goods or with productivity shocks and
market frictions.2
1The theory and evidence presented here are extensions and reﬁnements of material
presented in the author’s recent book, J. E. Floyd, Interest Rates, Exchange Rates and
World Monetary Policy, Springer, 2010.
2See, for example, William D. Lastrapes, “Sources of Fluctuations in Real and Nominal
Exchange Rates,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 74, No. 3, 1992, David Bachus
and Gregor W. Smith, “Consumption and Real Exchange Rates in Dynamic Economies
with Nontraded Goods,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 35, 1993, 297-316,
Robert A. Amano and Simon Van Norden, “Terms of Trade and Real Exchange Rates:
the Canadian Evidence,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 14, No. 1,
1995, 83-104, Michael B. Devereux, “Real Exchange Rates and Macroeconomics: Evidence
and Theory,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1997, 773-808, Pierre-
Richard Ag´ enor, “Capital Flows, External Shocks and the Real Exchange Rate,” Journal
of International Money and Finance, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1998, 713-740, and Yu Sheng and
Xinpeng Xu, “Real Exchange Rate, Productivity and Labor Market Frictions,” Journal
of International Money and Finance, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2011, 587-603. For a tiny rigorous
precursor of the model developed here, see Peter Neary, “Determinants of the Equilibrium
Real Exchange Rate,” American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1988, 210-215. And
for a broader model applied to exchange rate policy in developing countries, see Sebastian
Edwards, Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation and Adjustment, MIT Press, 1989.
1Section I develops a broad-based theory to form the basis for subsequent
empirical analysis that can reﬂect directly on the practical implementation of
monetary policy in small open economies like Canada. The focus on Canada
is useful because its economy is so closely connected to the large United
States economy. The model suggests and incorporates a wide range of factors
determining Canada’s real exchange rates with respect to the United States
and the world at large and outlines the eﬀects of short-run and long-run
monetary policy on nominal and real exchange rates. It ﬁnds some speciﬁc
implications of real and nominal exchange rate shocks for the choice of a
ﬁxed as opposed to ﬂexible exchange rate regime and for the conduct of
monetary policy under ﬂexible exchange rates. An important consideration
arising within the theory is the possibility and implications of exchange rate
overshooting.3
Implications of the theory are tested empirically in Section II. The major
factor aﬀecting Canada’s real exchange rate with respect to the United States
is found to be changes in the ﬂow of capital into and out of Canada as
compared to its southern neighbor. A lesser, but important factor is changes
in world energy prices. The eﬀects of Canadian and U.S. real income are those
predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, with short-run employment
eﬀects operating in the opposite direction. And eﬀects of world commodity
prices and Canadian terms of trade changes turn out to be important as
well. A very important empirical result is that monetary shocks, despite the
possibility of overshooting, have no measurable eﬀects on short-run real and
nominal exchange rate changes, a fact that has important implications for
interpreting the on-going conduct of monetary policy.
Section III brings the theory and evidence together to reach an under-
standing as to how monetary policy in a country like Canada should be
conducted. Given the evidence that can be extracted as to what the Bank
of Canada is in fact doing, the general conclusion emerges that it is doing
things correctly by indirectly following virtually an identical policy to that
in the United States using what seems to be an orderly markets approach.
Although the United States authorities purport to operate on real interest
rates and thereby on domestic investment, that option is not available to a
small country like Canada embedded in a world capital market. But control
3For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Mathias Hoﬀman, Jens Sondergaard
and Niklas J. Westelius, “The Timing and Magnitude of Exchange Rate Overshooting,”
Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 28, 2007.
2of overnight borrowing rates in Canada nevertheless provides a good method
of inﬂuencing the expected domestic inﬂation rate, which is crucially impor-
tant for policy. And it also enables the Bank to change the proﬁtability of
and thereby induce gradual adjustments of bank reserves with eventual ef-
fects on the stock of base money. While nominal exchange rate adjustments,
and associated short-run real exchange rate changes turn out to be an im-
portant monetary policy instrument for a small-open-economy like Canada,
potentially observable direct short-term pressure by the Bank of Canada on
the exchange rate through base money stock adjustments is desirable only
in situations of major world crises like the one recently experienced or under
circumstances where the Canadian inﬂation rate for some reason has continu-
ally deviated substantially from an appropriate level. The empirical evidence
uncovered here makes it possible to arrive at a rough estimate of how far the
Bank of Canada would have to change the nominal and real exchange rates,
under the critical circumstances above, to move the unemployment rate in
a desired direction by one percent, with the real exchange rate returning to
its long-run equilibrium level as inﬂation expectations and wages and prices
eventually adjust. An obvious related conclusion is that the Bank of Canada
should not announce, or claim credit for, any short-run real and nominal
exchange rate changes that economic conditions require it to engineer.4
I: The Theory of Real Exchange Rate Determination
The real exchange rate is the relative price of domestic output in terms





where Q is the real exchange rate, Π is the nominal exchange rate deﬁned
as the foreign currency price of domestic currency, P is the domestic price
level and ˜ P is the foreign price level. At a given level of the real exchange
rate, the nominal exchange rate will be inversely related to the ratio of the
domestic over the foreign price level—that is, by the extent of past domestic
relative to foreign price inﬂation. The domestic and foreign price levels can
4For a careful non-technical analysis of the role played by the exchange rate in Bank
of Canada policy, see Christopher Ragan, “The Exchange Rate and Canadian Inﬂation
Targeting,” Bank of Canada Working Paper 2005-34, November 2005.
3be expressed as geometrically weighted averages of the prices of the traded












where 1 > θ > 0 and 1 > ˜ θ > 0 are the fractions of domestic and foreign
output represented by non-traded components. Here it is assumed that all
goods have traded and non-traded components. Even the classic non-traded
good, haircuts, has traded components because hair stylists will be using
clippers, chairs and other things that can be imported from abroad. And the
classic traded good, wheat, will have cost components representing domestic
labour required to arrange storage, transport and sale. Substituting these













































where ˜ PTD is the foreign currency price of the domestic traded componont of
output. The real exchange rate of Canada with respect to the United States
will thus depend on the ratio of the prices of the non-traded components of
Canadian output to the prices of the non-traded components of U.S. output
and on the prices of the Canadian traded output components relative to the
prices of the U.S. traded output components.
It is clear from the above that we can expect Canada’s real exchange rate
with respect to the U.S. to rise when the prices of commodities and energy
rise in international markets, relative to the prices of other goods, because
production of these commodities represents a higher proportion of Canadian
output than United States output. More broadly, we would expect that a rise
in Canada’s terms of trade with respect to the rest of the world relative to the
U.S terms of trade with the rest of the world would also lead to an increase in
the real exchange rate. And, according to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis,
4we would also expect the real exchange rate to rise in response to an increase
in domestic relative to foreign full-employment income.5 As income rises
so do real wages and the relative increase in real wages increases the cost
of producing the non-traded components of output relative to the cost of
producing foreign non-traded output components. A further obvious factor
causing the real exchange rate to rise will be shifts of demand of domestic
residents from goods with low non-traded components to those with high
non-traded components. While shifts of this sort will be extremely diﬃcult
to measure, one obvious measurable factor might be the share of government
expenditure in domestic output since there are obvious political pressures
on government to channel its spending as directly as possible to domestic
residents.
Finally, we can expect that a decision of international investors, in re-
sponse to new technological developments, to increase their investment in
Canada relative to their investment in United States will produce an in-
creased demand for the non-traded components of Canadian as compared to
U.S. output, requiring a higher relative price of Canadian output to achieve
equilibrium. This rise in the real exchange rate will have to reduce the current
account surplus, or increase the current account deﬁcit, suﬃciently to oﬀset
the increased net capital inﬂow. This follows from the fact that domestic
income, denoted by Y , can be divided into the components
Y = C + I + BT + DSB (5)
where C is total private plus government expenditure on consumption, I is
total private plus government expenditure on investment, BT is the balance
of trade in goods and services excluding the services of capital, and DSB
is the debt service balance which equals total income from foreign employed
capital owned by domestic residents minus total income from domestically
employed capital owned by foreigners. Subtraction of total consumption and
investment from both sides produces the expression
Y   C   I = BT + DSB (6)
5B. Balassa, “The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 72, No. 6, 1964, 584-96, and Paul A. Samuelson, “Theoretical
Notes on Trade Problems,” Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1964,
145-154.
5which reduces to
S   I = CAB (7)
where S = Y   C is the level of savings and CAB = BT + DSB is the
current account balance. These conditions are true by deﬁnition when the
variables are the actual values and represent the condition of output-market
equilibrium—the equality of aggregate demand and supply—when the vari-
ables are the desired magnitudes. For equilibrium to occur, the real exchange
rate, and perhaps also the level of income and thereby savings must adjust to
ensure that the above equality holds. The role of real exchange rate adjust-
ment becomes obvious when we recognize that the current account balance
can be expressed
CAB = BT(Q,Y, ˜ Y ) + DSB (8)
where ˜ Y is the level of foreign income, ∂CAB/∂Q < 0, ∂Y/∂Q < 0 and
∂ ˜ Y /∂Q > 0. This expression can be written equivalently as
S   I   DSB = BT(Q,Y, ˜ Y ) (9)
or as
I   S + DSB =  BT(Q,Y, ˜ Y ) (10)
which states simply that the net capital inﬂow plus debt service balance must
be equal to the negative of the balance of trade in goods and services. When
capital ﬂows in, a rise in the real exchange rate will be required to increase
imports relative to exports and thereby decrease the balance of trade surplus
or increase the balance of trade deﬁcit to create a ﬂow of goods into the
country equal to the inﬂow ﬂow of ownership claims to capital. An increase
in domestic income will increase imports at any given real exchange rate,
reducing the balance of trade, and an increase in foreign income will raise
exports, increasing it. This will, of course, require corresponding adjustments
of savings relative to investment, given the general equilibrum nature of the
adjustment process.
Under full-employment conditions, an appropriate graphical presentation
of the above simultaneous relationship is presented in the ﬁgure below.
6The vertical SI line gives the excess of savings over investment at the current
level of full-employment income and the BT curve gives the response of
the real exchange rate to changes in the full-employment net capital inﬂow.
An increase in domestic investment relative to savings shifts SI to the left
causing the real exchange rate to rise and the current account surplus (deﬁcit)
to decline (increase) as the equilibrium moves from point a to point c. An
increase in commoditiy or oil prices in the Canadian case, or an increase
in that country’s terms of trade holding the U.S. situation unchanged, will
cause the BT curve to shift upward to the right moving the equilibrium from
point a to point b. An upward shift of BT will also occur in response to
an increase in Canadian full-employment real income holding income abroad
constant.
The question immediately arises as to the validity of the assumption that
the SI line is vertical. It would seem reasonable to expect that a change in
the real exchange rate would have eﬀects on the net capital inﬂow in both
directions. The fact that the relative price of Canadian in terms of world
output increases with a rise in the real exchange rate can be reasonably
expected to make additional in investment in Canada proﬁtable. At the
same time, however, the eﬀect of the rise in the real exchange rate on the
7wealth of Canadian holders of domestic-employed capital will probably result
in some increase in domestic savings. The fact that investment and savings
move in the same direction makes the combined eﬀect on the slope of the
SI curve unclear. Given our lack of knowledge about the magnitudes of the
opposing eﬀects, the best alternative would seem to be to continue assuming
that the SI line is vertical, recognizing that some bias in our results in one
direction or the other may be present.
Short-run transitory changes in income and employment will aﬀect the
two curves in opposite directions. An increase in output and employment,
holding the full-employment level of income unchanged, will result in an
increased supply of domestic goods in world markets, causing the BT curve
to shift downward to the left. At the same time, the public’s recognition
that the increase in income is transitory will cause savings to increase as
consumption is maintained at its inter-temporally optimal level, causing the
SI line to shift to the right. The real exchange rate will decline and the
current account balance will increase.
Letting domestic consumption and investment be functions of the real
interest rate and domestic income, the domestic aggregate real goods market
condition becomes
Y = GD(˜ r + ρ,Y,ΦD) + BT(Q,Y, ˜ Y ,ΦB) + DSB (11)
where the function GD() is domestic private plus public aggregate demand
for goods and services with ˜ r being the world real interest rate and ρ the risk
premium on domestic-employed capital and ΦD and ΦB are shift variables.
Full equilibrium, of course, also requires conditions of asset equilibrium.
For a small open economy like the Canadian one operating in a world capital
market, asset equilibrium can be expressed by a single equation, the demand
function for real money balances, with a risk premium or discount on Cana-
dian employed assets encorporated, along with the expected rate of inﬂation,
in the interest rate variable. With the nominal money supply on the left side,
this equation becomes




1  L(˜ r + ρ + Ep,Y,ΦM) (12)
where M is the nominal money stock, the Canadian real interest rate is
˜ r +ρ and Ep is the expected rate of Canadian inﬂation, making ˜ r+ρ+Ep
8the domestic nominal interest rate. And the function L(˜ r + ρ + Ep,Y,ΦM)
is the demand function for domestic real money balances with ΦM being
another shift variable.





Equations (11) and (12) and (13) form the complete model relevant for
the anaysis that follows.
The domestic authorities have two basic options. They can either ﬁx the
exchange rate or let it ﬂoat. Let us begin by assuming that Canada adopts a
ﬁxed exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar. Under conditions of price
ﬂexibility and full-employment, where Y = Yf and Q = Qf , the real goods
market equilibrium equation (11) becomes purely descriptive and, given the





where ¯ Π is the ﬁxed U.S. dollar price of the Canadian dollar. The Cana-
dian price level will rise and fall through time with the full-employment
real exchange rate level. As will be established in the empirical work be-
low, Canada’s real exchange rate with respect to the U.S. has varied very
substantially over the years making a ﬁxed exchange rate system a poor
choice. Given the ﬁxed levels of output and prices, the asset equilibrium
equation (12) simply determines the nominal money stock the authorities
must maintain in order to validate the ﬁxed exchange rate—this level of do-
mestic liquidity can be maintained by appropriate open market operations in
domestic securities together with purchases and sales of U.S. dollar reserves
in the open market.
Turning now to the short-run situation where the domestic price level
cannot adjust, we impose on the model the additional assumption that P =
¯ P . Equation (13) now produces the short-run equilibrium level of the real
exchange rate
Q =
¯ Π ¯ P
˜ P
9which will not vary in response to changes in its full-employment equilibrium
level. This real exchange rate level plugs into the output-ﬂow equilibrium
equation (11) to produce the short-run equilibrium level of Y which, when
substituted into the asset stock equilibrium equation (13) again generates
the level of liquidity that the Canadian authorities must supply to maintain
the ﬁxed exchange rate.
Clearly, an independent Canadian monetary policy is not possible. But
the domestic authorities could still bring about appropriate variations in the
level of domestic output and employment by a properly constructed ﬁscal
policy that shifts ΦD and can also make economically ineﬃcient variations in
the level of output through tariﬀ and trade policies that shift ΦD . Note also
that changes in the full-employment equilibrium level of the real exchange
rate will create deviations of Q from Qf . To the extent that Qf falls relative
to Q, domestic exports will decline relative to imports, reducing the level
of Y in the goods market equilibrium equation (11). The very substantial
eﬀects of changes in the full-employment equilibrium real exchange through
time that will be shown empirically below will have major short-run eﬀects
on output and employment in the process of generating the substantial long-
run eﬀects on the Canadian price level. This makes the argument against
adopting a ﬁxed exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar even stronger.6
Suppose alternatively what is in fact the case—that Canada allows the
dollar to ﬂoat freely in international markets. Under conditions of price
ﬂexibility and full employment, the imposition of Y = Yf in the asset equi-
librium equation (12) generates an equilibrium real stock of money M/P .
The domestic authorities can now fully control the price level by variations
in the nominal money supply. That equilibrium level of prices, together with
the full-employment equilibrium level of the real exchange rate, generates the





The major variations in Qf through time will now simply result in propor-
tional variations of Π with the Canadian price level being fully under the
6For a broad discussion of the merits of a ﬂexible exchange in the Canadian case see
John Murray, “Why Canada Needs a Flexible Exchange Rate,” North American Journal
of Economics and Finance, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2000, 41-60.
10control of the domestic authorities. As in the ﬁxed exchange rate case the
real goods market ﬂow equilibrium equation (11) becomes purely deﬁnitional.
Now let us impose short-run rigidity of the Canadian price level, making
for the moment an assumption that there is pricing to market—that is, that
the Canadian prices of traded goods are ﬁxed independently of movements
in the exchange rate.7 When we plug this ﬁxed price level into the asset
equilibrium equation (12) we obtain the following relationship between the
nominal money supply and output.
M = ¯ P L(˜ r + ρ + Ep,Y,ΦM)
The short-run equilibrium level of output will respond positively to changes
in the money supply, and negatively to positive shifts in the demand for
liquidity. When we plug this level of output into the goods market equation,
that equation generates the short-run equilibrium level of the real exchange
rate which, when plugged into equation (13), produces the equilibrium level
of the nominal exchange rate.
Clearly, when the exchange rate is ﬂexible the Canadian authorities are
able to conduct a counter-cyclical monetary policy. Moreover, as can be seen
from the goods market equation (11) combined with the fact that the level
of domestic output and employment is determined by the condition of asset
equilibrium, ﬁscal or tariﬀ produced shifts in ΦD or ΦT will lead to suﬃcient
opposite changes in Q to neutralize any eﬀect on income and employment.
The above result that monetary policy works only under ﬂexible exchange
rates and ﬁscal policy only under ﬁxed exchange rates goes back to the path-
breaking work of Fleming and Mundell.8
A diﬃculty in the ﬂexible exchange rate case is the possibility of ex-
change rate overshooting if the Canadian authorities operate directly on the
monetary aggregates. A monetary expansion results in the attempt by as-
set holders to re-balance their portfolios by exchanging money holdings for
non-monetary assets. This causes the nominal and real exchange rates to
7C. Betts and Michael B. Devereux, “Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Model of Pricing
to Market,” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2000, 215-44
8J. M. Fleming, Domestic Policies under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Staﬀ Papers 9, 1962, 369-379 and R. A. Mundell, Capital Mobility
and Stabilization Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics and Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1963, 475-485.
11devalue and thereby leads to an expansion of exports relative to imports and
domestic output and employment suﬃcient to increase demand for money
holdings to equal the new higher stock of nominal money balances. This can
be seen from the asset equilibrium equation (12). An increase in M on the
left side of that equation must be matched by and equal increase in the right
side for asset market equilibrium to be maintained. Since output prices can-
not change in the short-run, the fall in Π will reduce the real exchange rate
and shift world demand onto domestic output, causing Y to increase by an
amount which, together with any exchange rate induced rise in the domestic
price level, will increase the right side of the equation to equal the increase
in the left side. The problem is that it takes time for the balance of trade
and the level of real income to respond to a fall in the real exchange rate.
Until an output response can take place the fall in the nominal exchange
rate which, under the pricing-to-market assumption above holding all nomi-
nal prices constant, has no eﬀecton the right-hand side of (12) so there is no
equilibrating mechanism—the nominal and real exchange rates will have no






a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate causes a rise in the in the domestic
prices of at least some of the traded components of output. Taking the
logarithm of equation (12) under these circumstances where output prices,
the real and nominal interest rates and real output are constant, we obtain
log(M) = θlog(PN) + (1   θ)[log( ˜ PT)   log(Π) + log(L(˜ r + Ep,Y ))
=  (1   θ)log(Π) (14)














Under the reasonable assumption that two-thirds of domestic output is non-
traded and varies in price with changes in the nominal exchange rate, a
one percent increase in the nominal money supply will cause the nominal
12exchange rate to fall by three percent. But this now ignores the fact that it
will take at least some ﬁnite period of time for the domestic currency prices
of the traded components of output to adjust to the exchange rate change. In
the days during which these prices remain unchanged the nominal exchange
rate may fall much further, with the only equilibrating mechanism being a
speculative one arising from knowledge that there has to be a lower limit to
its the long-run equilibrium level. The expectation that the real exchange
rate will eventually rise back to its full-employment level implies that the
price of domestically employed capital will rise relative to the price of capital
employed abroad, signifying a real capital gain. This will cause the price
of domestically employed capital to rise relative to its cost of production,
lowering the domestic real interest rate which can then be expressed as
r = ˜ r + ρ   Eq (17)
and equation (14) must be modiﬁed as follows, where the interest rate vari-
able and its components are not expressed in logarithms and Eq is the ex-
pected rate of change in the real exchange rate, ϵ > 0 is the income elasticity
of demand, and η < 0 the interest semi-elasticity of demand, for real money
balances.
log(M) = θlog(PN) + (1   θ)[log( ˜ PT)   log(Π)]
+η (˜ r + ρ   Eq + Ep) + ϵ log(Y ) (18)
An increase in Eq lowers the domestic real and nominal interest rates, in-
creasing the right side of the equation and thereby requiring a smaller decline
in the real and nominal exchange rates to produce equilibrium.9
Quite apart from overshooting exchange rate eﬀects of money supply
shocks, there are also good reasons to believe that potential overshooting ex-
change rate eﬀects of shocks to the demand for money will occur from time to
time. During the period between late-1962 and early-1970 when Canada was
on a ﬁxed exchange rate and, for reasons noted above, the supply of money
was endogenous, the standard deviations of the month-to-month percentage
changes in the monetary base, M1 and M2 were 2.4, 3.6 and 2.6, suggesting
substantial short-run exchange rate eﬀects had Canadian liquidity growth
9For the original formulation of this this equilibrating mechanism, see Rudiger Dorn-
busch, “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics,” Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 84, No. 6, 1976, 1161-76.
13been held constant and the dollar allowed to ﬂoat. This presence of money
demand shocks rules out money growth rules as a policy focus. Indeed, given
the presence of exchange rate overshooting pressures resulting from demand
for money shocks, a central background feature of Bank of Canada policy
must be the maintenance of orderly markets—the accusation of permitting
or creating market instability is a central banker’s nightmare. The standard
way to ensure orderly markets is to continually adjust base money growth
and credit provision to the banking system to prevent short-period exchange
rate movements from jumping sharply from day to day outside the normal
trading range. The problem with this approach, of course, is that the Bank
will end up ﬁnancing all major changes in the domestic demand for liquidity
with the result that it will ﬁnance any changes in the expected rate of in-
ﬂation. Any major independent inﬂuence by the Bank on domestic output
and employment and, in the longer run, inﬂation will necessarily involve sig-
niﬁcant pressure on the nominal exchange rate. The problem is that when
the Bank induces changes in the market value of the Canadian dollar it loses
sight of the equilibrium level of that exchange rate.
Contrary to popular opinion, it is unreasonable to expect the Bank of
Canada to be able to manipulate the domestic real interest rate. Normal ad-
justments of the nominal money supply will induce a relatively small relative
change in the world demand for domestic assets and it is thus diﬃcult to
imagine that ρ, the underlying risk premium on domestically employed real
capital, will be signiﬁcantly aﬀected. Even though it has no control over the
underlying levels of domestic real interest rates relevant for investment deci-
sions, however, there are two reasons why it makes good sense for the Bank
of Canada to announce targets for, and exercise control over, the interest rate
at which it will lend reserves to the domestic banking system. First, setting
a target for the overnight lending rate helps establish public awareness of the
Bank’s commitment to its inﬂation target. It is extremely important that
the public have an appropriate expected inﬂation rate because by following
an orderly markets monetary policy that keeps the nominal exchange rate
from jumping sharply outside normal trading ranges the Bank can end up
ﬁnancing that expected inﬂation rate. Second, by controlling the rate at
which it will lend to the banking system and at which the commercial banks
will be able to borrow from each other, the Bank of Canada can aﬀect the
proﬁtability to commercial banks of expanding their reserves and deposits
and thereby exercise an element of direct inﬂuence on money supply growth
14followed by hopefully gradual nominal and real exchange rate changes in the
appropriate direction.
In the long-run, of course, the expansion of output and employment re-
sulting from the devaluation of the Canadian dollar and fall in the real ex-
change rate that will inevitably result from increased domestic monetary
expansion will lead to upward pressure on and increases in the Canadian
price level that will reduce domestic output and raise the real exchange rate
back to their full-employment levels.
II: The Empirical Evidence
The time paths of Canada’s real and nominal exchange rates with respect
to the United States and the ratio of the Canadian over the U.S. price levels
are shown in Figure 2 below, with all three variables indexed to the base of
1974 = 100.
15Canada’s real exchange rate fell by about 25 percent between the late-
1970s and the mid-to-late-1980s and then rose by about 20 percent by the
early-1990s. Then after falling about 30 percent to the early years of the 21st
Century it rose back above its 1974 level by the end of 2010. The Canadian
price level rose relative to the United States price level by about 20 percent
in the 16 years between 1974 and 1990 and then this ratio declined a bit
less than 5 percent by the year 2000 and was trend-less thereafter. The
relatively smooth behaviour of the price level ratio as compared to the real
exchange rate resulted in a pattern of nominal exchange movements pretty-
much in step with those of the real exchange rate. There is no doubt that
the movements of Canada’s real and nominal exchange rates with respect to
the United States were very substantial.
The above theoretical analysis suggest that an analysis of the factors
determining Canadian long-run equilibrium exchange rates should begin by
regressing the logarithm of Canada’s real exchange rate with respect to the
United States on the following variables.10
1) The logarithm of the prices of commodities excluding energy in U.S. dollars
divided by an equally weighted average of the U.S. dollar prices of U.S. ex-
ports and imports.
2) The logarithm of energy prices in U.S. dollars divided by an equally
weighted average of the U.S. dollar prices of U.S. exports and imports.
3) The logarithm of Canada’s terms of trade with respect to the rest of the
world divided by the U.S. terms of trade with respect to the rest of the world.
4) Canadian government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP
minus U.S. government consumption expenditure as a percentage of that
country’s GDP. The use of government consumption rather than total ex-
penditure focuses on a portion of government activity that would seem more
likely to concentrate on the use of domestic labor and non-traded resources.
5) The logarithm of Canadian real GDP.
6) The logarithm of United States GDP.
7) The percentage of the Canadian labour force employed.
8) The percentage of the United States labour force employed.
10The sources of the data on these variables are discussed in the Appendix attached to
the end of this paper.
169) The net capital inﬂow into Canada plus the debt service balance as a
percentage of Canadian GDP minus the net capital inﬂow into the U.S. plus
that country’s debt service balance as a percentage of U.S. GDP, where the
net capital ﬂows plus the debt service balances are estimated as the negative
of the country’s balances of trade in goods and services.
In the earlier published work, the terms of trade variable, government
consumption variable and the two GDP variables turned out to be statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant and were dropped, and no attempt was made to investigate
any long-run implications of the employment rate variables. The regression
result below extends that regression to the period from 1974Q1 to 2010Q4
rather than ending at 2007Q4.11 And the terms of trade ratio and the excess
of Canadian over U.S. government consumption expenditures now turn out
to be statistically signiﬁcant and are therefore added.
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION: 1974Q1 -- 2010Q4
Dependent Variable: Log of Real Exchange Rate
Coeff Std-Err T-stat P-Val
Constant 0.378 0.668 0.566 0.286
Log Commodity Prices 0.342 0.099 3.460 0.000
Log Energy Prices 0.140 0.037 3.801 0.000
Net Capital Inflow Difference 0.020 0.003 5.767 0.000
Govt Consumption Difference 0.017 0.010 1.711 0.045
Log Terms of Trade Ratio 0.326 0.193 1.691 0.047
Number of Observations: 148
Degrees of Freedom: 142
R-Squared: 0.7586192629935458
Coefficient Standard Errors are Newey-West HAC Adjusted with Lag = 3
LM-Test for Serial Correlation of Residuals: Number of Lags = 3
Chisquare Statistic = 610.702130496176 P-Value = 0.0
11For the original result, see page 159 of J. E. Floyd, Interest Rates, Exchange Rates
and World Monetary Policy, Springer 2010.
17Statistical insigniﬁcance of the real GDP variables was attributed to the
high-correlation between them and the ability of the other series to capture
the trend in the data. It turns out, however, that the addition of the em-
ployment rates along with the real GDP variables for the period 1976Q1 to
2010Q4 for which employment rate data was available produces the result
below. The terms of trade ratio and the diﬀerence government consumption
expenditures as percentages of GDP were both statistically insigniﬁcant but
replacement of the logarithm of the ratio of the Canadian over U.S. terms of
trade with the logarithm of the Canadian terms of trade alone resulted in a
clearly statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the latter variable and a P-value
for the government consumption diﬀerence variable that is too close to the 5
percent level to ignore.
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION: 1976Q1 -- 2010Q4
Dependent Variable: Log Real Exchange Rate
Coeff Std-Err T-stat P-Val
Constant -2.808 1.145 -2.453 0.008
Log Commodity Prices 0.441 0.118 3.725 0.000
Log Energy Prices 0.140 0.034 4.152 0.000
Net Capital Inflow Difference 0.026 0.004 6.270 0.000
Log Canadian Terms of Trade 0.738 0.285 2.590 0.005
Govt Consumption Differene 0.023 0.014 1.644 0.051
Log Canadian Real GDP 2.593 0.520 4.985 0.000
Log U.S. Real GDP -2.288 0.459 -4.986 0.000
Canadian Employment Rate -0.040 0.009 -4.238 0.000
U.S. Employment Rate 0.032 0.009 3.560 0.000
Number of Observations: 140
Degrees of Freedom: 130
R-Squared: 0.8353665799855272
Coefficient Standard Errors are Newey-West HAC Adjusted with Lag = 3
LM-Test for Serial Correlation of Residuals:Number of Lags = 3
Chisquare Statistic = 234.587514136516 P-Value = 0.0
18This result is consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis that an in-
crease in domestic relative to foreign full-employment real income will in-
crease the domestic real exchange rate and, at the same time, consistent
with the idea that a short-run increase in domestic output due to greater
utilization of domestic resources will increase its supply and cause the rela-
tive price of that output to fall.
One might question whether the two regressions shown above might be
spurious. There are three reasons to believe that this is not the case. First,
the logarithm of commodity prices is a stationary variable and the fact that
it is statistically signiﬁcant implies that the residuals of a regression that
does not include it must also be stationary. This implies that the set of
variables variables other than the commodity price variable are cointegrated.
Second, a Johansen cointegration test for the ﬁve non-stationary variables in
the the regression that did not include the real GDP and employment rate
variables indicates rejection at the one-percent level of the null-hypothesis
that there is not at least one cointegrating vector. And ﬁnally, while the
chances of obtaining statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in regressions of one
non-stationary variable on another are quite high, the chances of obtaining
nine statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients with the expected signs in regressions
of a non-stationary variable on a constant and nine other non-stationary
variables are surely close to zero.12
At this point it is important to recall that the net capital inﬂow variable
is the net capital inﬂow into Canada from all countries as a percentage of
Canadian GDP minus the net capital inﬂow from all countries into the U.S. as
a percentage of that country’s GDP. And these net capital inﬂow variables
must equal the value of imports from minus exports to all countries. Since
the net capital inﬂows into both Canada and the United States can arise as a
consequence of technological and other developments in third countries, and
capital ﬂows into and out of those countries, a possible source of bias in the
coeﬃcient estimates in the regressions above is present. The correlation of
capital ﬂows into Canada with that country’s real exchange rate with respect
to the United States will depend on what is happening in third countries
to inﬂuence their capital inﬂows and outﬂows. The real exchange rates of
12When ten non-stationary variables are independently constructed by summing normal
random shocks having standard deviations of unity, and then one of these variables is
regressed on the other nine, all variables will be statistically signiﬁcant with positive (or
pre-selected) signs in not even one of 1000 runs most of the time.
19those other countries with respect to the United States will also be changing
through time so that a change in Canada’s real exchange rate with respect to
the United States will be correlated with changes in the real exchange rates
of other countries with respect to the United States and will therefore not
necessarily be a good measure of Canada’s real exchange rate with respect to
the rest of the world. Subsequent analysis based on the regression coeﬃcient
of the net capital inﬂow variable cannot routinely hold constant the real
exchange rates of the U.S. with respect to third countries in order to specify
that changes in Canada’s real exchange rate with respect to the United States
represent proportional changes in her real exchange rate with respect to the
rest of the world.
To circumvent this problem we need to include in our regression the real
exchange rates with respect to the United States of all the major trading
countries in the world. This is, of course, impossible because of resulting
degrees-of-freedom limitations. It turns out, however, that when the real
exchange rates of the United Kingdom and Japan with respect to the United
States are added individually to the regression, their coeﬃcients turn out to
be statistically insigniﬁcant and, when included together, both coeﬃcients are
statistically insigniﬁcant. There are insuﬃcient data to enable the addition
of the real exchange rate of the Euro Area with respect to the United States
for the entire period. For the period 1999 onward, however, we can usefully
add the real exchange rates of Japan, the Euro Area and the United Kingdom
with respect to the U.S. to a regression that includes only the three main
variables of interest. When we do this the real exchange rates of the Euro
Area and the United Kingdom, but not Japan, turn out to be statistically
signiﬁcant when added separately but the Euro Area and U.K. real exchange
rates both are statistically insigniﬁcant when added together. This is a classic
case of multicolinearity. As the F-test below shows, the null hypothesis that
the Euro Area and U.K. real exchange rates with respect to the U.S. together
contribute nothing to the explanation of the Canadian real exchange rate
with respect to the United States can be easily rejected.
20ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION: 1999Q1 -- 2010Q4
Dependent Variable: Log Real Exchange Rate
Coeff Std-Err T-stat P-Val
Constant -0.403 0.304 -1.326 0.096
Log Commodity Prices 0.465 0.085 5.464 0.000
Log Energy Prices 0.227 0.024 9.512 0.000
Net Capital Inflow Difference 0.022 0.004 5.139 0.000
UK vs US Real Exchange Rate 0.184 0.145 1.268 0.106
EA vs US Real Exchange Rate 0.023 0.126 0.184 0.427
Number of Observations: 48
Degrees of Freedom: 42
R-Squared: 0.9672678469701822
Adjusted R-Squared: 0.96337116208568
Sum of Squared Errors: 0.04069918824314939
F-Statistic: 248.2283981486915
P-Value 0.0
F-Test for exclusion of both E.A. and U.K. real exchange rates
F-Statistic = 14.431035572101907
P-Value = 2.1475246620994426E-6
While the sample size is small, bootstrapping to obtain coeﬃcient estimates
produces a range of coeﬃcient values consistent with that obtained in the
above regression as can be seen in the results below. And the coeﬃcient
of the net capital inﬂow variable, which will be important in subsequent
analysis, is quite consistent with that obtained in the earlier real exchange
rate regressions that did not include third-country real exchange rates with
respect to the United States.
21BOOTSTRAPPED COEFFICIENTS
Quantile CONST PCOMM PENGY DNCIN REXUK REXEA
.01 -1.0634 0.2597 0.1742 0.0121 -0.1317 -0.2147
.025 -0.9486 0.3023 0.1832 0.0136 -0.0788 -0.1841
.05 -0.8566 0.3347 0.1884 0.0151 -0.0371 -0.1504
.10 -0.7466 0.3591 0.1965 0.0165 0.0103 -0.1150
.25 -0.5764 0.4057 0.2102 0.0186 0.0855 -0.0471
.75 -0.1980 0.5079 0.2404 0.0239 0.2682 0.1111
.9 -0.0431 0.5600 0.2535 0.0265 0.3512 0.1877
.95 0.0869 0.5912 0.2625 0.0277 0.3921 0.2281
.975 0.1865 0.6131 0.2708 0.0285 0.4300 0.2621
.99 0.1865 0.6480 0.2750 0.0296 0.4660 0.2936
median -0.3922 0.4554 0.2256 0.0214 0.1811 0.0325
mean -0.3873 0.4580 0.2254 0.0213 0.1784 0.0356
Finally, it is necessary to determine whether unanticipated money supply
shocks have had over-shooting eﬀects on the Canadian real exchange rate
with respect to the United States. To do this, four estimates of unantici-
pated shocks to the three monetary aggregates in Canada and the United
States were calculated. First, 10-year running regressions of the current level
of each monetary aggregate on two-years of quarterly lags of both that ag-
gregate and domestic nominal GDP were used to obtain a ﬁtted value for
each period and then a forecasted value for each period based on the 10 pre-
vious years of data. Then two additional estimates were calculated by the
same method based on two-years of quarterly lags of the relevant monetary
aggregate alone, without the inclusion of lagged nominal GDP. The diﬀer-
ences between the actual value and each forecasted or ﬁtted value of each
aggregate as a percentage of the forecasted or ﬁtted value were then used as
estimates of the unanticipated shock to the monetary aggregate in question.
Each pair of the four unanticipated shock measures for the relevant Canadian
and U.S. monetary aggregate were then added to the long-period regression
that included real GDPs and employment rates. Our theory tells us that the
Canadian unanticipated money shocks should be negatively related to the
Canada vs. U.S. real exchange rate and that the U.S. unanticipated shock
should be positively related. This positive relationship is expected because
a U.S. unanticipated money shock will make monetary conditions easier in
22the United States than in Canada, lowering world interest rates because the
U.S. is a large country, and increasing the demand for money in Canada.
Of the twelve regressions produced by the addition of the above calculated
unanticipated money shocks, in only one case was an unanticipated money
shock variable statistically signiﬁcant and in that case the statistically sig-
niﬁcant United States M2 shock had the wrong sign. These results are sim-
ilar to those obtained in earlier research using a wider range of measures of
unanticipated money shocks.13 There is clearly no evidence of exchange rate
overshooting, a result consistent with the Bank of Canada having followed
an orderly markets approach to monetary policy. Any monetary policy un-
dertaken by the Bank must have operated via gradual smooth adjustments
of the nominal exchange rate.
What, then, were the most important factors determining the movements
of Canada’s real and nominal exchange rates with respect to the United
States. Obviously, the main regression indicates that the world prices of
energy and commodities excluding energy, capital movements into and out of
Canada as compared to the United States and Canadian and U.S. output and
employment were signiﬁcantly related to the real exchange rate movements.
But how important were speciﬁc individual factors? To answer this question,
the eﬀects of the individual variables on the real exchange rate over the
sample period were calculated and, after adding constant amounts suﬃcient
to equalize the mean value of each calculated eﬀect with the mean value of
the real exchange rate, plotted along with the real exchange rate.
The eﬀect of world prices of commodities excluding energy is shown in the
ﬁgure below. The decline in commodity prices was clearly related to the fall
in the real exchange rate in the late-1970s and the decline and turn-around
in the mid-1980s. And commodity prices were roughly related to the real
exchange rate movements after 2002.
13See J. E. Floyd, Interest Rates, Exchange Rates and World Monetary Policy, Springer,
2010, pages 209-222.
23Graphical presentations of the eﬀects of world energy prices and of the
net capital inﬂow into Canada as a percentage of GDP minus the net capital
inﬂow into the United States as a percentage of that country’s GDP are
encorprated in the Figure 4 and Figure 5 on the next page. As can be
seen from top ﬁgure, the rises in energy prices following the late 1990s are
clearly reﬂected in corresponding changes in the real exchange rate. And
more importantly, as is clear in Figure 5, there was a rough but very strong
relationship between net capital inﬂows into Canada as compared to the
U.S. on the real exchange rate. The fact that the eﬀect of the capital inﬂow
diﬀerence lags the real exchange rate movements after 1990 may well reﬂect
the time it takes for the inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital to become translated into
a ﬂow of real capital through adjustments of the current account balance in
response to resulting movements in the real exchange rate. The eﬀects of
Canadian and U.S. real GDPs and employment rates and of the Canadian
terms of trade on the real exchange rate are plotted in Figures 7 and 8 on
the subsequent page.
242526The real GDPs and employment rates together appear to have had a
positive eﬀect on the real exchange rate during the period before mid-1985
in which it declined substantially. And the Canadian terms of trade obviously
had a positive eﬀect in addition to that of commodity and energy prices and
clearly contributed the increase that occurred after the year 2000 and to the
downward spike during the latter years of that decade.
The Conduct of Monetary Policy
The complete lack of any observable relationship between unanticipated
money supply shocks and the Canadian real exchange rate with respect to
the United States suggests very strongly that, by using a orderly market
approach to conducting monetary policy, the Bank of Canada follows pretty
the monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve System.
It is clear from Figure 8 below that the pattern of real GDP changes
was the same in both countries although the some movements are greater
and others are smaller in one or other country. And the same is true of
the two countries’ unemployment rates plotted in Figure 9. The overall
higher unemployment rate in Canada than in the United States is quite likely
the result of diﬀerent institutional conditions reﬂecting government policy
relating to unemployment insurance. And it is probably the case that the
major increase in the U.S. relative to Canadian unemployment rate during
the past few years was due to the much greater severity of the recent ﬁnancial-
crises-induced recession in the U.S. because of diﬀerences in Canadian and
U.S. regulation of their ﬁnancial institutions.
2728The Canadian and United States year-over-year inﬂation rates are plotted
in Figure 10 below. Both inﬂation rates were very high until the mid-1980s,
having peaked in the mid-1970s and again in the early-1980s. The Canadian
inﬂation rate was much more variable than that in the United States and
was clearly higher in the high-inﬂation period. After the mid-1980s the two
inﬂation rates averaged much the same. Contrary to the situation with re-
spect to real GDP growth, the Canadian inﬂation rate declined much more
during the recent recession than the U.S. inﬂation rate but, since it also rose
much more during the recovery, this may well be a reﬂection of its overall
greater variability during the whole period.
The two ﬁgures on the next page present further evidence that the Bank
of Canada has been reproducing U.S. monetary policy. The deviations from
trend of the logarithms of domestic base money, the domestic money stock
calculated as a simple average of M1 and M2, and the consumer price index
are presented for the United States in Figure 11 and for Canada in Figure
12.
2930The underlying trends of the logarithms of the variables are upward since
the years from the late-1960s to 1981 were years of very substantial inﬂation.
Notice that the money supply and the consumer price index in the U.S.
move more or less together, rising relative to trend until the early 1980s and
then falling relative to trend thereafter while, at the same time, U.S. base
money rose at a rather stable rate relative to trend all the way to the late-
1990s. The United States authorities clearly failed to reduce the stock of
base money relative to trend to compensate for the increase in the money
multiplier, making the same error they made in the 1930s but in the opposite
direction and with much less disturbing consequences. And it appears from
Figure 11 that at least the initial decline in the money stock relative to trend
after the early-1980s was not induced by a downward adjustment of base
money. One possibility, noted in earlier research, is that U.S. government
deregulation during that period resulted in an increase in the demand for
money balances.14
It is clear from Figure 12 at the bottom of the previous page that the
Bank of Canada ﬁnanced the same degree of inﬂation in Canada that was
occurring in the United States by adjusting the stock of base money as one
would expect from an orderly markets approach to policy. Moreover, as noted
in the earlier research just cited, it turns out that the authorities in Britain,
Japan, France and Germany did essentially the same thing.
The central question here is whether Canada would have been better oﬀ
following a monetary policy that was independent of and diﬀerent from that
followed in the United States. Given that Canadian monetary shocks oper-
ate through exchange rate changes and that overshooting is likely to occur if
these shocks are not carefully controlled, attempts to follow a diﬀerent policy
than that being followed in the United States may lead to market instability.
Moreover, apart from the period of inﬂation noted above, which hopefully
will not be repeated, the U.S. policy makers have been doing about as well as
one could reasonably expect. Information is very imperfect and underlying
changes in the economic situation can only be observed with a lag. And
policy actions will produce results only with a further lag, perhaps one suf-
ﬁciently long for the impact of the policy to occur after the problem being
14See pages 327 to 340 of J. E. Floyd, Interest Rates, Exchange Rates and World Mon-
etary Policy, Springer, 2010, and R. A. Gilbert, “Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did
and Why It Passed Away”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, February 1986,
22-37.
31addressed has dissipated. It is well known that aggregate economic instabil-
ity arises because the private sector has imperfect information about future
forces driving the economy and as a result makes decisions that later turn
out to be wrong. If the authorities have information that the private sector
does not have, they might best simply publish it so that the private sector
can properly take that information into account. If they do not have more in-
formation than the private sector has, their short-term monetary actions can
make a situation worse by adding further variability to economic conditions
and thereby increasing the uncertainty facing private decision makers. Ac-
cordingly, it is often argued that, apart from situations of ﬁnancial crises like
the one recently experienced, the monetary authorities should concentrate
on providing stable monetary conditions over the long run that will provide
an appropriate long-run inﬂation rate, and should avoid fruitless attempts to
oﬀset business cycles.
The situation is even more diﬃcult for a small open economy like Canada
than a big one like the United States. The Canadian authorities have to ﬁgure
out what the U.S. authorities are doing and the impacts of those policies on
both the United States and Canada. They then have to decide what eﬀects
various domestic policy actions will have, given the eﬀects of U.S. policy,
keeping in mind that domestic policy pressures on Canada’s highly variable
real exchange rate have the immediate eﬀect of making its equilibrium level
unobservable. Of course, the Bank of Canada can adjust the overnight rate
at which banks can borrow and lend reserves from each other and from
itself. To the extent that the impact is slow and gradual, appropriate non-
overshooting pressures on the exchange rate may occur. And the variations
of the overnight rate together with the presentation of an inﬂation target may
help keep inﬂationary expectations within a desirable range. The problem is
that no obvious eﬀects of such policies are visible in the data, except in so far
as they simply produce similar monetary conditions as exist in the United
States.
Given the evidence above, it would seem reasonable that, barring a huge
world ﬁnancial and economic crises or a rise in world and Canadian inﬂa-
tion of the magnitude experienced in the 1970s, the Bank of Canada should
continue with its present approach to monetary policy implementation. An
additional feature of this orderly markets approach is that it will neutralize
the Mundell-Fleming result that equilibrating real exchange rate movements
will automatically oﬀset the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy under a ﬂexible exchange
32rate regime—to the extent that the Bank of Canada continually ﬁnances the
public’s desire to adjust their desired money holdings, it will ﬁnance changes
in those desired holdings that result from expansionary eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
on domestic output.
In the case of a world economic crises, which will necessarily aﬀect Canada,
the Bank will have to gradually force down the nominal and real exchange
rates by controlled monetary expansion. Again, this control over the ex-
change rate will also allow short-term eﬀects of expansionary ﬁscal policy
to take eﬀect. Here it should be kept in mind that this is not a beggar-
thy-neighbor policy—to the extent that all countries put similar downward
pressure on the value of their currencies, the world money supply will increase
and world real interest rates will fall. In a situation where the domestic core
inﬂation rate becomes unacceptably high, the Bank has to tighten money
and put upward pressure on the nominal and real exchange rates leading to
an increase in the domestic unemployment rate suﬃcient to induce price and
wage setters to modify downward their expected inﬂation rates and reduce
the rates at which they increase wages and prices through time. Once the
expected inﬂation rate has adjusted downward to the appropriate level, that
level can then be maintained by an orderly markets monetary policy that ﬁ-
nances the desired growth rate of monetary holdings at the current inﬂation
rate.
As a ﬁnal task, the previous empirical real exchange rate analysis can
be used to get an idea of the amount by which the Bank of Canada would
have to force the nominal and real exchange rates down or up to expand or
contract employment by a speciﬁed amount—say one percentage point. The
purpose is to determine empirically the eﬀect of a fall in the real exchange
rate due to monetary policy on output and employment and the current ac-
count balance and net capital ﬂow—that is, to empirically account for and
measure the shifts and slope of the BT line in Figure 1 along with shifts of
the SI line resulting from monetary policy induced short-run real exchange
rate changes. Since considerable simultaneity is involved, the best approach
is to write down equations representing the determinants of BT and SI and
then see what can be accomplished using the estimated coeﬃcients in the
basic regression that includes real GDPs and employment rates, incorporat-
ing other available information as necessary. The equation of the BT curve
can be written as
q = α + β ˆ BT + γ E (19)
33where q is the logarithm of the real exchange rate, β < 0 is the slope of the
BT curve, ˆ BT is the full-employment current account balance and associ-
ated full-employment net capital outﬂow as a percentage of the current full-
employment level of domestic GDP under the assumption that the U.S. net
capital inﬂow and full-employment GDP are unchanged and therefore incor-
porated in the constant term α. Finally, E is the Canadian employment
rate (percentage of the labour force employed), with the U.S. unemployment
rate being constant and also incorporated in α, and γ < 0 is the change
in the log of the real exchange rate in response to a change in the percent-
age of the labour force employed. According to the basic regression result
above, β =  .026, and γ =  .04. The actual current account balance,
which is called BT , is equal to the full-employment current account balance
minus any increase in imports that results from a subsequent change in the
employment rate.
BT = ˆ BT   mY = ˆ BT   mδ E (20)
where m is the marginal propensity to import out of a change in current
income Y and δ is the increase in that income, as a percentage of its full
employment level, produced by a one percentage point expansion of the level
of employment. Finally, it is necessary to impose the fact that savings minus
investment under less-than-full-employment conditions must equal the less-
than-full-employment current account balance—that is,
BT = sY   I = sδ E   I , (21)
where s is the marginal propensity to save out of the change in current
income and I is a constant equal to the constant underlying level of domestic
investment where, by construction, the real interest rate is unchanged and
the level of employment and savings and investment do not change abroad.
Equations (20) and (21) together yield the following expresion for ˆ BT ,
ˆ BT = (m + s)δ E   I , (22)
which upon substitution into (19) yields
q = α + β (m + s)δ E   β I + γ E
= α   β I + [β (m + s)δ + γ]E . (23)
34Rearrangement of the above equation produces the response of the employ-
ment rate to a monetary policy induced change in q .
E = A +
1




α   β I
β (m + s)δ + γ
is a constant term that incorporates exogenous shifts of the BT curve on
account of forces beyond our present concern.
If the public fully understands what is happening and inter-temporally
smoothes consumption, the entire transitory shock to income will be saved,
so s will equal unity and m will equal zero. We then need only to specify a
value for δ , which represents the eﬀect of a one percentage point increase in
the percentage of the labour force employed on the logarithm of the level of
output. If the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas, this will equal
the share of labour in output. There is controversy over the exact magnitude
of this share because of the complexities of trying to estimate it from available
data. A rough guess would postulate a share of 0.7. However, in the present
circumstances where there is a variation of the level of employment of a given
stock of labour under given technological conditions the possibility arises that
the utilization of capital could change in a diﬀerent way than it would under
full-employment conditions—in particular, the current level of the capital
stock could become over- or under-employed in the same way as labour.
This would suggest a higher value for δ . In addition, of course, the elasticity
of substitution of labour for capital in the full-employment situation may be
diﬀerent from the Cobb-Douglas value of unity. Under these circumstances it
will be useful to attempt to calculate δ by regressing the level of output on
the level of employment. A graph the time paths of the percentage deviation
of Canadian real GDP from its trend level, along with the percentage of the
labour force employed is presented on the next page. The two series are
obviously correlated and it is clear that the variation of real GDP around
its trend is much greater than the variation of the percentage of the labour
force employed. A regression of the logarithm of Canadian real GDP on the
percentage of the labour force employed together with trend produces the
result on the next page below the graph.
35ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION: 1976Q1 -- 2010Q4
Dependent Variable: Log of Canadian Real GDP
Coeff Std-Err T-stat P-Val
Constant 2.574 0.173 14.859 0.000
Trend 0.007 0.000 57.899 0.000
Employment Rate 0.014 0.002 7.277 0.000
Number of Observations: 140
Degrees of Freedom: 137
R-Squared: 0.9942048936116979
Coefficient Standard Errors are Newey-West HAC Adjusted with Lag = 3
LM-Test for Serial Correlation of Residuals: Number of Lags = 3
Chisquare Statistic = 1358.4379478207427 P-Value = 0.0
36Had the percentage deviation of real GDP from its trend been used and
the trend variable omitted, the result would be the same except for the
magnitude of the constant term. The ﬁt is remarkably good but there is
clearly substantial serial correlation in the residuals, the presence of which
indicates that variables aﬀecting real GDP are left out of the regression.
The coeﬃcient of the Canadian employment rate implies that an increase
in the level of employment of one percent will lead to an increase in real
GDP of 1.4 percent. This makes no sense—one would have to argue that
the increase in employment of labour stimulates an even greater relative
increase in the employment of capital. Indeed, as just noted, other factors
than the employment rate are aﬀecting real GDP. Thus, it is necessary to
rely on information about the share of labour, possibly allowing for some
increase in the utilization of capital, to establish a value for δ . Allowing for
the possibility that increased capital utilization could accompany short-run
employment expansion, a value for δ of around 0.7 would seem reasonable
and an interval of 0.6 through 0.75 would seem a reasonable range to allow
for error.15
Assuming that a one-percent increase in the level of employment increases
output by .7 percent of its full-employment level so that δ = .7 , and
using the values of β and γ implied by the basic regression result, the total








which implies that a one percent or .01 fall in the logarithm of the real
exchange rate will lead to a percentage increase in the level of employment
of a bit more than 0.17 percent. And to increase the level of employment by
1 percentage point, the Bank of Canada would have to expand the money
supply suﬃciently to reduce the nominal and real exchange rate by about
6 percent. In the case where δ = .75, the above magnitudes change to
.0595 and 16.8 and when we let δ = .6, they become .0556 and 17.98. So
the range of real exchange rate devaluation required to increase the level of
employment by 1 percentage point would be from 5.5 to 6 percent.
15Colleague Margarida Duarte must be thanked for a helpful discussion of the range of
possible values.
37The assumption that the public regards the increase in current income
as entirely transitory is probably unrealistic, given the lack of current infor-
mation about the cause of the observed increase in its income. Suppose, to
take the most extreme case, that the public incorrectly regards the observed
increase in its income as permanent. A long-period average of the ratio of
Canadian aggregate private consumption to gross national income yields,
when subtracted from unity, a an estimated fraction of permanent income
saved of approximately .22 and corresponding average ratio of imports of
goods and services to gross national income is approximately .26. Using









and a monetary expansion induced fall in the exchange rate of slightly un-
der 5 percent would be required to increase the level of employment by 1
percent of the labour force. A smaller fall in the exchange rate and less mon-
etary expansion is required because of the multiplier eﬀect of expansion of
consumption expenditure resulting from the increase in employment and in-
come. When δ ranges between .6 and .75 the required fall in the exchange
rate ranges between 4.75 and 4.94 percent.
As a rough guess one might conclude that to get a one percent increase
in the fraction of the labour force employed, a monetary expansion suﬃcient
to reduce the nominal (and real) exchange rate by between 5 and 6 percent
will probably be required.
This result can be seen graphically in Figure 14 below. A fall in the real
exchange rate from a to b will, because of the simultaneity issues involved,
increase the current account balance by less than c d for one deﬁnite rea-
son plus possibly another plausible reason. First, the associated short-run
increase in employment will increase domestic relative to foreign output, re-
ducing its value in world markets and shifting the BT curve downward to
the left. In addition, it is quite likely that domestic residents will not realize
that the observed increase in output and income is entirely transitory, with
the result that consumption and imports will increase, shifting the BT curve
downward to the left by an additional amount. The increase in the current
account balance, and in savings relative to investment will thus be of a mag-
nitude like c e. And in this event, although the current account balance will
38increase by less, the level of employment and income will increase by more
as a consequence of the multiplier eﬀect of the increase in consumption.
Finally, the fact that a monetary expansion induced fall in the real ex-
change rate of between ﬁve and six percent will increase domestic employment
by one percentage point does not mean that the Bank of Canada should try
to use nominal exchange rate manipulation to achieve less variability of the
Canadian unemployment rate. First of all, as the Bank of Canada begins
moving the nominal and real exchange rates it loses sight of their equilib-
rium level and, hence, the magnitude of the eﬀect of its policy. Second, the
Bank of Canada observes the unemployment rate and current output with a
substantial lag, and the eﬀects of its change in the real exchange rate on out-
put and employment will only take place after a further lag. As a result, the
expansion of employment induced by Bank policy may well begin to occur
just as the economy is recovering from the recession and thereby accentuate
subsequent inﬂationary pressure. Monetary manipulation of the nominal and
real exchange rates is a useful policy only under the circumstances in which
the Bank of Canada needs to bring about a signiﬁcant change in the un-
derlying domestic core inﬂation rate, or in the event of a catastrophic world
crises.
39The analysis has focused on the excess of the net capital inﬂow into
Canada as a percentage of that country’s GDP over the net capital inﬂow
into the Unites States as a percentage of U.S. GDP. That focus was based
on ease of exposition. As can be seen from the Figure 15 above, the United
States experienced a net capital inﬂow for all but the early years of the period
examined and Canada experienced net capital outﬂows (negative net capital
inﬂows) for all but three small intervals over the period.
Of course, while monetary policy is necessarily operating through move-
ments of the real and nominal exchange rates, there is no reason for the Bank
of Canada to engage in public discussion regarding the pressures it is putting
or planning to put on the Canadian dollar. It should merely announce future
monetary expansion or contraction and give the reason why. The last thing
the Bank of Canada needs is to be regarded as responsible for the level of the
dollar in the international market and therefore be under constant pressure
from private interests to raise the dollar or lower it—or do both!
40In this regard it is important to make clear that there is no way that the
monetary authorities can bring about a permanent change in the real ex-
change rate. Once wages and prices have adjusted to policy induced changes
in aggregate demand and employment the price level will have changed to
completely reverse the policy induced change in the real exchange rate and
the nominal value of the currency will have adjusted proportionally in the
opposite direction to the price level. Attempts to permanently lower the
real exchange rate will merely result in continual increases in the domes-
tic inﬂation rate. Recently, the Chinese government has been accused by
U.S. interests of lowering the country’s real exchange rate to make its ex-
ports more competitive in world markets. To lower its real exchange rate by
trade policy, a country would have to tax exports and thereby reduce rest-
of-world demand for the domestic currency or subsidize imports to increase
the supply of the domestic currency on the international market. Neither of
these policies would make political sense in a democratic country. The usual
restrictive trade policies involve taxing imports or subsidizing exports. This
has the eﬀect of reducing the supply of domestic currency on the foreign ex-
change market as a result of reduced imports and increasing the demand due
to increased exports. The domestic real exchange rate—that is, the interna-
tional value of domestic output—will rise as a result of the increased world
demand for domestic output. Another possible way to reduce a country’s
real exchange rate would be for the government to run a budget surplus and
invest it abroad, which the Chinese government may in fact be doing. There
are two problems with this type of policy for a democratic country in which
the public is informed about government policy. First, the private sector may
compensate by reallocating private savings from foreign to domestic invest-
ment to oﬀset its increased indirect foreign investment exposure. In addition,
a continuous government budget surplus is not likely to be acceptable to vot-
ers who would rather receive government beneﬁts than pay taxes. Of course,
a government can easily cause capital to ﬂow abroad and the country’s real
an nominal exchange rates to fall by incompetent policy actions that make
the country a poor place to invest!
41APPENDIX
The sources of the data series used in this study are as follows, where
IMF/IFS refers to the International Monetary Fund: International Financial
Statistics, FRED refers to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database,
NIAS refers to the United States National Income Accounts Statistics. An
additional database used was the Canadian database CANSIM.
1) Canadian Nominal Exchange Rate ($Can per $US)— IMF/IFS 156/RF
2) Japanese Nominal Exchange Rate (Yen per $US) — FRED EXJPUS
3) U.K. Nominal Exchange Rate ($US per Pound) — FRED EXUSUK
4) Euro Area Nominal Exchange Rate (Euro’s per US$) — IMF/IFS 163/RF
5) US$ Prices of Commodities Less Energy — CANSIM V36383 and V52673497
6) US$ Prices of Energy — CANSIM V36384 and V52673498
7) Canadian Consumer Price Index — IMF/IFS 156/64
8) United States Consumer Price Index — IMF/IFS 111/64
9) Japanese Consumer Price Index — FRED JPNCPIALLQINMEI
10) United Kingdom Consumer Price Index — FRED GBRCPIALLMINMEI
12) Euro Area Consumer Price Index — IMF/IFS 163/64H
13) Index of United States Export Prices — IMF/IFS 111/75
14) Index of United States Import Prices — IMF/IFS 111/76X
16) Index of Canadian Export Prices — IMF/IFS 156/75
17) Index of Canadian Import Prices — IMF/IFS 156/74
18) Canadian Nominal GDP — IMF/IFS 156/98B.C
19) United States Nominal GDP — IMF/IFS 111/98B.C
20) Canadian Implicit GDP Deﬂator — IMF/IFS 156/99BIR
21) United States Implicit GDP Deﬂator — IMF/IFS 111/99BIR
22) Canadian Exports of Goods and Services — IMF/IFS 156/90C.C
23) Canadian Imports of Goods and Services — IMF/IFS 156/98C.C
24) U. S. Exports of Goods and Services — IMF/IFS 156/90C.C
4225) U. S. Imports of Goods and Services — IMF/IFS 98C.C
26) Canadian Government Consumption Expenditure — IMF/IFS 156/91F.C
27) U. S. Government Consumption Expenditure — IMF/IFS 111/91F.C
28) Canadian Percentage of Labour Force Unemployed — CANSIM V2062815
29) U. S. Percentage of Labour Force Unemployed — FRED UNRATE
30) Canadian Base Money — CANSIM V37145
31) Canadian M1 — IMF/IFS 156/34..B and V37127
32) Canadian M2 — IMF/IFS 156/34B + 136/35 and CANSIM V37128
33) U. S. Base Money — FRED BOGAMBNS
34) U. S. M1 — FRED M1NS
35) U. S. M2 — FRED M2NS
36) Canadian Gross National Income — IMF/IFS 156/99AC
37) Canadian Private Sector Consumption — IMF/IFS 156/99F.CZ
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